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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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
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7 JUNE 1972 (VOL. XXIII, NO. 23)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 MAY - 4 JUNE 1972

Moscow (2803 items)			Peking (1125 items)		
Nixon USSR Visit [Party-Government Bodies' Approval of Summit	(16%) ()		Domestic Issues Indochina [Sihanouk PRC Tour UNESCO Sessions	(34%) (13%) (4%) (0.5%)	53% 12% 4%]
Brussels Conference on European Security	(0.5%)	7%	Tunisian National Day Chilean Economic	() ()	5% 3% 3%
(Brezhnev Message West Berlin Agreement	() ()	5%] 4%	Delegation in PRC Nixon USSR Visit	()	
Supreme Soviet Ratification of USSR-FRG Treaty	()		MIXUN OSSK VISIL	()	1%
Indochina	(2%)	3%			
China	(2%)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi has continued to avoid any explicit mention of President Nixon's Moscow trip, but North Vietnamese disapproval has been shown in articles which criticize, without identification, some of the President's statements in the USSR. Hanoi followed a similar pattern regarding the President's February visit to China. Commentator articles in both the party paper NHAN DAN and the army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN argue that the hypocrisy of the President's assertions about peace and negotiations is shown by his decision to mine North Vietnam's ports and to continue the massive use of air power. The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman has continued to issue daily protests over the air strikes, with those on 2 and 4 June charging that U.S. planes have continued to drop mines.

In the wake of the President's visit, Moscow has continued to insist that its policy of coexistence and detente is compatible with support for the Vietnamese struggle. Sensitivity on this issue was shown, however, in Soviet media's truncation of President Tito's remarks in an interview for Moscow TV--in which he expressed concern over escalation of the Vietnam war and stressed the socialist countries' international duties in aiding the Vietnamese.

Victnamese communist propaganda marking the talked anniversary of the founding of the South Victnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government uniformly praises the communist offensive in the South. While neither North nor South Vietnam held the usual meetings in observance of the anniversary, the occasion was marked by a visit to the PRG representation in Hanoi by a delegation headed by Truong Chinh. Both Chinh and the PRG representative seemed to allude obliquely to the President's summit trips in expressing confidence in socialist support. Moscow marked the anniversary in a low key, much as it did last year, with a Soviet leaders' message and a meeting in Moscow. The Chinese again, as in 1971, treated the anniversary as a major e. nt, though the intervening improvement in Sino-U.S. relations was clearly evident and was made all the more apparent by the PRG envoy's harsh attack on the Nixon Administration.

DRV ATTACKS PRESIDENT'S MOSCOW VISIT WITHOUT REPORTING EVENT

Two days after Hanoi radio had mentioned the President's visit to Iran, North Vietnamese media's rhetorical charade regarding his Moscow trip was continued when Hanoi radio and VNA carried the 2 June NHAN DAN Commentator article quoting from his remarks in Moscow

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without identifying them. Hanoi's studied avoidance of any explicit reference to his visit to the Soviet Union was again evidenced in an English-language broadcast later on the 2d which referred to the President's 1 June report to Congress without explanation. Mention of Moscow was also avoided in Commentator articles attacking the President in NHAN DAN on the 3d and in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 4th. NHAN DAN said that the President's "newest gift of deceit" to the American people was advanced on 1 June "in the form of a boastful speech to the U.S. Congress after a long trip abroad." And QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said that "Nixon ballyhooed the success of his trips" before the U.S. Congress. The failure to mention the Moscow trip was even more pointed in & Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese on 4 June which said: "According to U.S. news agencies, on the night of 1 June in Washington, half an hour after he returned from a visit to a number of countries in Europe and to Iran, Nixon hurriedly went to the U.S. Congress to report on this trip in order to utter boasts and to seek congressional support and votes in the race for the presidency later this year."

The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 2d said that once again the President's "deceitful" arguments "have been ballyhooed in an attempt to deceive public opinion." Commentator differentiated between his remarks at a 22 May dinner and in his Moscow TV speech on the 29th, by explaining that "at a banquet" he "boasted about creating a more peaceful world for all nations," and that

in a statement Nixon ballyhooed at length that there can be real peace only when the weak are as sefe as the strong countries, that U.S. strength will be used only to defend peace and never to undermine it, and to safeguard freedom and never to destroy it, that the only healthy basis for international peace and progress is equality of sovereignty and mutual respect, and that the United States is struggling for a world free from fear.

Commentator said the President "imagined" that a number of people would believe these "boasts" and added: "The more beautiful his statements are, the more his deceitful arguments are drowned out by U.S. bombs and shells that explode continuously, day and night, on Vietnamese territory." The article also took sharp issue with some of the President's remarks on the role of the big powers. Thus Commentator labeled as a "shopworn and very vicious

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argument" the President's assertion that big powers should set examples for small countries and not let themselves be dragged into wars initiated by small countries. And he asked rhetorically whether the President wants big countries to set examples in the same way the United States has in Vietnam.

The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 3d, as broadcast in Hanoi radio's domestic service, obliquely alluded to the Peking as well as Moscow trip when it said that pursuing his election campaign, the President "has gone to the East and West aboard his plane the Spirit of '76." As in the article on the 2d, Commentator cited and ridiculed the President's remarks in the Soviet Union as part of his general policy of "deceit." Referring to the President's "frequent" talk about shifting from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation, the article said that "for more than three years -- on the battlefield, at the Paris conference and in many diplomatic activities -- Nixon's objective has always been aimed at seeking a military solution to the Vietnam problem." But, it added, the U.S. air and naval forces' "destructive, threatening and pressure-creating measures and the blockade of DRV ports . . . can in no way shake our determination."

Reiterating Hanoi's stress on the need to return to the Paris talks, Commentator said: The United States "must not sabotage the Paris conference as it is doing; traveling here and there and knocking on doors everywhere will definitely fail to help solve any problems." (The Vietnamese communist delegations in Paris again this week issued statements "demanding" that the Thursday session be held.)

The NHAN DAN article seemed to display some concern to reassure the North Vietnamese when it set out to demonstrate that the President allegedly is facing widespread opposition to his policies and will have great difficulties in his campaign for reelection. Commentator said:

Following his fairly sensational diplomatic moves, Nixon is showing a semblance of optimism, considering his remaining in the White House for another four years to be beyond discussion. This is another farce to fool U.S. public opinion. At the bottom of his heart this crafty President most clearly realizes that his race to stay in the White House will be very difficult and fierce. It is not by accident that on 1 June less than one-half of the U.S. Congressmen were present to welcome Nixon following his long trip abroad.

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Neither of the NHAN DAN Commentator articles explicitly mentioned the President's alleged attempts to divide the socialist countries, but QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's Commentator on the 4th said that none of his "machinations" can "divide or prevent friendly countries from supporting our anti-U.S. national salvation resistance, a struggle of national and great international significance. The peoples of the socialist countries and other revolutionary peoples . . . are strongly supporting our people who are fighting the stubborn and warlike Nixon clique."*

USSR PLEDGES SUPPORT TO VIETNAMESE FOLLOWING PRESIDENT'S TRIP

Moscow propaganda following President Nixon's visit has continued to juxtapose reiterations of Soviet adherence to a policy of coexistence and negotiations with reaffirmations of support for the Vietnamese and other peoples of Indochina. Some defensiveness seemed evident, however, in Brezhnev's remarks at a Kremlin dinner for President Tito on 5 June. Brezhnev described the talks with the President as an event "of great international importance," lauded the statement on basic principles and the agreements on SALT and other issues, and explained that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union "was, is, and will remain a socialist, class, internationalist one." He added that this is why the Soviet Union is "against acts of aggression, against any attempts to suppress the liberation struggle of the peoples, to interfere in their affairs, to violate their rights," and went on to reaffirm Soviet assistance and support to the peoples of Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries.

Soviet sensitivity to some of Tito's remarks was apparent in Moscow reports of his 31 May interview for Soviet TV, prior to his departure for Moscow. As reported by the Yugoslav news agency TANJUG, Tito had expressed concern over U.S. mining of DRV ports and the possibility that the war might assume "even wider proportions," and he had stressed "the duty of all socialist countries" to assist the Vietnamese. Reports of the interview carried by TASS on the 3d and published in PRAVDA on the 4th

^{*} The army paper in a Commentator article on 21 May-on the eve of the President's arrival in Moscow-had charged that the President "is sowing disunity and sabotaging the socialist camp" and a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 20th had referred to the President's "divisive schemes and deceits" and "wicked political intrigues." See the 24 May TRENDS, pages 10-12.

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truncated these remarks, although Soviet media did echo TANJUG in reporting that "we are all obliged to do all we can to help the Vietnamese people." (On 5 June TANJUG briefly reported that at a session that day of the Yugoslav coordinating committee for aid to Vietnam it was decided to send "substantial consignments" of aid to Vietnam. The report added that the session "considered measures for further support and aid to the people of Vietnam in the light of recent developments and further escalation of the war by the United States.")

Other propaganda on Tito's visit has further indicated some strains between the two sides in connection with the U.S.-Soviet summit and Vietnam. For example, TANJUG in reporting Tito's talks with Soviet leaders on the 6th cited unnamed sources for the opinion that "there exist some differences in views and interpretations of various world events."*

Moscow press and radio comment on President Nixon's trip has stressed the Soviet Union's "principled internationalist position" on such questions as Indochina and the Middle East, with a 3 June IZVESTIYA international review by Mikhaylov asserting that during the talks the Soviet side "confirmed its unshakable solidarity" with the Vietnamese people's struggle. A Druzhinin Moscow domestic service commentary on the 2d, observing that there is displeasure in the West that no agreement was reached on Vietnam, declared that "true to its internationalist duty and to its principles of ever firmly supporting the anti-imperialist struggle," the Soviet Union could never conclude a "deal" on Vietnam.

Accounts of the President's address to the joint session of Congress on the evening of 1 June, carried by TASS and published in PRAVDA, noted his remark that the problem of ending the Vietnam war was one of the most extensively discussed subjects during the summit. The accounts also reported that the President said that each side had its own point of view and approach "to this very difficult issue." But, of course, there was no acknowledgment of his assertion that a full review of all that was said on the subject would only jeopardize the search for peace.

TASS on the 1st, in reporting the approval of Brezhnev's report on the summit by party and government bodies, said that full

^{*} For a detailed discussion of Tito's visit see the USSR-Yugoslavia section of this TRENDS.

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support was expressed for "the consistent, firm position" set forth at the talks by the Soviet delegation "on the question of the continuing U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the other countries of Indochina." And it added that "the USSR's solidarity with the Vietnamese peoples' heroic struggle was and remains firm."

DRV PROTESTS U.S. AIR STRIKES, ACCUSES NIXON OF "WAR CRIMES"

Hanoi has continued to publicize daily protests over U.S. air strikes from the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. The targets are described in general terms and allegedly include farms, factories, economic and cultural establishments and water conservancy projects. There is little supporting comment on the strikes, but VNA's press review on 7 June quoted a NHAN DAN editorial as charging that alleged U.S. bombing of irrigation and dike systems in North Vietnam is aimed at destroying its economic and defense potential. The editorial reportedly went on to say that the "enemy's scheme may cause certain difficulties, but decidedly cannot prevent North Vietnam from maintaining and developing her agricultural production."*

Continuing the series of radio broadcasts, initiated on 31 May, charging the President with war crimes, Hanoi on 3 June focused on the President's decision to mine DRV ports. It said that this action, which "is entirely contrary to international law," is "all the more wicked in view of a secret 1969 report by Henry Kissinger which was made public by Senator Gravel." Hanoi cited the report as noting that goods arriving in Haiphong are essentially goods shipped under economic aid programs, and added that, therefore, the U.S. blockade is preventing such supplies as medicine and medical instruments from reaching Vietnam. The broadcast also observed that the 1969 report pointed out that there is no way to effectively prevent the transport of military supplies from China's mainland to North Vietnam by rail and road. And it added that since the President knows this it can only be concluded that he in fact is advocating attacks against civilians.

^{*} AP on 5 June reported that a Hanoi broadcast monitored in Hong Kong quoted NHAN DAN as saying that North Vietnam is having "very difficult" economic problems because of the bembing but that the enemy "can never prevent our survival and our ability to supply the South." FBIS has monitored no such broadcast.

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A broadcast in the series on the 4th focused on alleged U.S. schemes to attack North Vietnam's dikes. It claimed that it is evident that "the Nixon clique" has not ruled out such bombing since both Secretary Laird and Secretary Rogers have said that the only actions they would exclude are the use of nuclear weapons and the return of U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam. Hanoi charged that President Nixon "cunningly advocates the destruction of dikes before the flood season," since then "a crack even if mended will become a weak point that cannot hold back flash floods."

FOREIGN MINISTRY
SPOKESMAN PROTESTS

Specific charges levied in the series of protests by the foreign ministry spokesman during the past week include

the following:

- + The 2 June statement charged that on the 1st, U.S. planes were sent "to drop mines to blockade North Vietnamese harbors and to barbarously bomb and strafe Haiphong, Nam Dinh, Vinh and Viet Tri cities and many populous areas" in Lang Son, Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and in the Vinh Linh area. It said the targets included villages, hamlets, factories, farms, water conservancy projects and economic and cultural establishments, and it claimed the destruction of "many" homes and the Giao Chau church in Giao Thuy district, Nam Ha Province, and the killing or wounding of "many civilians."
- + The statement on the 3d said that on the previous day, U.S. planes "barbarously bombed and strafed Yen Bai provincial capital, the Phu Ly township of Nam Ha Province and many populous areas" of Yen Bai, Lang Son, Ha Bac, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces as well as Vinh Linh. U.S. ships also were said to have "indiscriminately shelled many coastal areas of Quang Xuong and Tinh Gia districts, Thanh Hoa province." Giving the same general list of targets as in the 2 June protest, it went on to cite the destruction of the Van Xa pagoda in Thanh Liem district, Nam Ha province, and to claim that "many" civilians were killed or injured.
- + The statement of the 4th charged that on the 3d, aircraft continued to mine North Vietnam's ports and "to savagely bomb and strafe Haiphong port city, Phu Tho provincial city and many densely populated areas" in Yen Bai, Thanh Hoa, Son La, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area.

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- + The statement on the 5th charged that on the previous day the United States continued to bomb and strafe "many" populous areas in Lang Son, Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces, "killing or wounding many civilians, mostly women and children, and destroying many homes and economic and cultural establishments." A VNA report of the 4 June raids charged that "many waves" of U.S. planes "stealthily attacked Luy Dong hamlet, Dong Hai village, in the vicinity of Haiphong city with thousands of steel pellet bombs, killing or wounding some dozen civilians in bed." According to the VNA press review on the 6th, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN scored those raids as a "new savage crime."
- + The foreign ministry spokesman on the 6th charged that the day before U.S. aircraft hit "many populated areas" of Lang Son, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. And he claimed that among the targets were "the Cac and Phuong Dong sluices and dikes in Nam Ha Province and many villages, district towns and factories," and that "many" civilians were killed or wounded.
- + The protest on the 7th said that on the 6th bombing was carried out in Hanoi's outskirts and in Haiphong as well as in Yen Bai, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. Targets allegedly included "many" villages, hamlets, cities, factories, dikes, dams and water conservancy projects, "including dike sections in Hung Nguyen district, Nghe An Province, and in Tyong Hai district, Thai Binh Province." The spokesman's protest claimed that "many civilians, mostly old people, women and children, were killed or wounded."

OFFENSIVE LAUDED IN HANOI, FRONT COMMENT ON PRG ANNIVERSARY

Hanoi's message of greetings on the 6 June anniversary of the 1969 founding of the Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam typifies other comment in its optimistic appraisal of the alleged achievements of the communist offensive in the South and its promise of continued North Vietnamese support. The message—as usual sent from Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh and Pham Van Dong to NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat—said that Vietnamization "is falling apart," and it predicted that "on the crest of victory" the people will move

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forward to defeat Vietnamization completely. It pointed to the folly of the Nixon Administration's thinking it could redress the critical situation in South Vietnam by "sabotaging" the Paris talks and escalating attacks on the North. And in a possible allusion to the President's summitry, it reaffirmed that "neither bombs and shells nor any deceptive political and diplomatic maneuver" can shake vietnamese determination to fight on.

While neither North nor South Vietnam held the usual meetings to mark the anniversary, the occasion did prompt a visit to the PRG representation in Hanoi by a delegation headed by Truong Chinh. VNA reported that during his 5 June visit Truong Chinh reaffirmed the North's intention to fulfill its obligations to the South and expressed the conviction that the resistance war, "though still facing many difficulties and hardships, will certainly end in complete victory." Chinh may also have had the President's trips in mind when he rejected the notion that a "blockade" of the DRV or "perfidious diplomatic moves can deny the DRV the aid from her brother countries," adding that "the patriotism and proletarian internationalism of our people and our brothers and friends shall triumph over the aggressors' modern technology."

Nguyen Phu Soai, the acting head of the PRG's representation in Hanoi, in his statement read over Hanoi radio, also remarked that "none of the enemy's cunning schemes and tricks" can divide the Vietnamese from the socialist countries. Soai had prefaced this by citing "the great, comprehensive, and effective material assistance and vigorous political and moral support" of the USSR, China, and other socialist countries. Consistent with other propaganda, he described the current communist offensive as a "stunning blow" at the Saigon government and yet another blow at the Vietnamization policy, "driving it rapidly toward total collapse."

The PRG's policy of "national concord" to unite diverse elements in South Vietnam was reiterated by Soai and he reported that "PRG representatives have sought by all means to establish broad contact with all strata of the people and with all patriotic forces and individuals at home and abroad in order to discuss with them urgent problems facing the country in the short as well as in the long run." The "national concord" policy was also discussed in a 1 June NHAN DAN article which recalled the formation of the Vietnam Alliance and the PRG and held that

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"the revolutionaries have proved ready to shake hands and take joint actions with all those who cherish national independence and freedom." The article maintained that the national concord policy was being applied in the "newly-liberated areas," and it claimed that "realities" in these areas have "smashed" the allies' "misleading claim" that "the revolution would engage in retaliatory terrorism when it is successful."

MOSCOW MARKS PRG ANNIVERSARY IN STANDARD FASHION

Moscow marked the third anniversary of the PRG in a low key, much as it did last year. The observance included the usual Soviet leaders' message and a Moscow meeting. The Moscow domestic service on the 6th said that the meeting was attended by Politburo alternate member Ponomarev, as well as the PRG and DRV ambassadors, and that it adopted a resolution condemning American aggression in Vietnam and pledging continued "support" to the Vietnamese people. A similar meeting last year was attended by Party Secretary Solomentsev and addressed by a deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee to Support Vietnam. The PRG ambassador gave his customary reception in Moscow, attended by alternate member of the Politburo Solomentsev and Party secretary Kapitonov. Last year Politburo member Grishin had attended, as he had in 1970 when he was a Politburo alternate member. An additional feature this year was a "campaign of solidarity" with the Vietnamese "patriots" which has occasioned low-level meetings and rallies.

The message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to Chairman Tho and President Phat praised the South Vietnamese patriots' military, political, and diplomatic victories and, like last year's, lauded the growing international prestige of the PRG. It added an expression of Soviet support for the PRG's "well-known position on a political settlement" as a "sensible and constructive basis for reestablishing a just peace in Vietnam." Like last year's, the current message promised continued Soviet "support" to the Vietnamese people, now adding the assertion that this is the Soviet Union's "international duty." The message concluded with an expression of hope that Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and solidarity will "grow in strength." Last year the message had praised the friendship and solidarity without indicating that there was room for improvement.

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At his reception, as reported by TASS on the 5th, the PRG ambassador thanked the Soviet Union and "all countries of the socialist community" for their "assistance," but Solomentsev referred only to the "support" from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries which helped frustrate U.S. attempts to impose a "diktat" on South Vietnam.

Comment, including a PRAVDA article reported by TASS on the 6th, also lauded the PRG's growing international prestige and reiterated support for the South Vietnamese struggle and for the PRG's program for a political settlement. The President's visit to the USSR was mentioned in anniversary material only on some Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts. A broadcast in English to Asia on 1 June recalled the Soviet side's expression in the joint communique of support for the Indochinese people's struggle and for the DRV and PRG stands on a political settlement. A broadcast in Mandarin to China on the 2d, refuting what it called recently increased charges in Chinese propaganda of "collusion between two superpowers," recalled that the Soviet-U.S. talks showed the Soviet policy of "firm rebuff" to U.S. aggression and devotion to the "Leninist principle of proletarian internationalism," again citing the Soviet side's stand on Vietnam expressed in the communique.

PEKING HAILS PRG ANNIVERSARY, SHOWS RESTRAINT TOWARD U.S.

Peking has again treated the anniversary of the PRG's founding as a major event, though the intervening improvement in Sino-U.S. relations since last year's second anniversary was reflected in Peking's muted criticism of the United States. As in last year's coverage, Peking's observance of the third anniversary was highlighted by a leadership message on the 5th signed by PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Premier Chou En-lai (c.ly Chou signed last year's), a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 6th, and a reception given that day by the PRG ambassador which occasioned a major Chinese leadership turnout. Notwithstanding this show of solidarity, however, Peking's current restraint was thrown into sharp relief by the PRG ambassador's stinging attack on the Nixon Administration.

During a period when top Chinese leaders have been conspicuous by their absence, suggesting the possibility of high-level meetings, the PRG ambassador's reception drew the attendance

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of Chou, Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Chun-chiao, Li Hsien-nien, and two Politburo alternates. Yeh delivered a speech, given on this occasion last year by the purged Huang Yung-sheng, whose leadership role is being played by Yeh. Also present was DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who arrived on 3 May "to discuss" the PRC's "supplementary assistance" to Vietnam but was absent during the late-May stopovers of DRV Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan. Ban also attended an anniversary reception given by Chinese friendship societies on 5 June, his first reported appearance since 16 May.

Both Yeh's speech and the editorial briefly criticized the mining of DRV ports by "the U.S. Government" -- the closest the Chinese came to referring to the Nixon Administration and their first authoritative reference to the mining in two weeks. Both expressed confidence that the U.S. moves would not subdue the Vietnamese, making no mention of Chinese interests. The PRG ambassador, in contrast, attributed the mining directly to the President, called the action "a quite serious new aggressive step of escalation showing clearly the warmongering and bloody nature of the Nixon Administration," and said it "defies insolently the socialist countries" and others. The ambassador also mentioned the Vietnam war as a factor in the U.S. election, a subject which Peking has been scrupulously avoiding. Also missing from Peking's comment were its claims on this occasion last year that Vietnam developments were inspiring the "revolutionary mass movement" in the United States.

The Chinese took the occasion to hail the current communist offensive in South Vietnam, but they stopped short of last year's claims—regarding actions during the Lam Son 719 operation—that communist victories were of "strategic importance." As in criticism of the United States, it was left to the PRG representative to make such a claim in the face of Chinese caution.

On the score of aid, Peking reiterated standard pledges to its "close brothers and comrades-in-arms" to provide "all-out support and assistance" in the war effort "no matter what forms the war may assume." While the leaders' message and the editorial called this Peking's "bounden !nternationalist duty," and Yeh stressed that this stand is "unswerving, no matter what happens," this year's reaffirmation of support was bland compared with Huang's reference last year to Peking's "unshirkable proletarian internationalist duty" and his invocation of the Mao "instruction" which says that failure to aid the Vietnamese would be "betrayal

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of the revolution."* The PRG ambassador repeated his expression of gratitude to the Chinese last year in saying this time that the PRC provides "big, precious, and effective aid," but a hint of less than full satisfaction with Peking's recent support is suggested by his failure to describe its aid as "timely," as he had done last year.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial spelled out the Chinese position on a settlement in demanding that the United States withdraw its troops unconditionally and totally, put an end to the Vietnamization program and to support for the "Thieu puppet clique," and give "serious consideration and positive response" to the PRG's seven-point plan and its two key points. Peking had not previously supported the Vietramese communist peace terms in its authoritative comment since before President Nixon's 8 May address** in which he proposed an internationally supervised cease-fire--a proposal that the Chinese have not as yet criticized. There was no Chinese reference on the anniversary to Washington's negotiating position, but the PRG ambassador, in calling on the United States to accept the seven-point plan and to resume the Paris talks, took the occasion to dismiss the President's 25 January eight-point proposal as "only a bluff." Last year the Chinese speaker had criticized the United States for "talking glibly" about ending the war while refusing to agree to withdraw its troops by a set date. In recent months Peking and its Vietnamese allies have diverged in their appraisals of the Nixon Administration as a negotiating partner.

EASTERN NAM BO PLAF COMMAND HAILS "VICTORIES" IN OFFENSIVE

Communist propaganda focuses attention on the fighting in provinces near Saigon with a flurry of comment accompanying the release, on 2 June, of a communique from the PLAF command for eastern Nam Bo. The communique, dated 30 May, praised "great victories" in the past two months and claimed that its armed forces and people had

^{*} The Mao instruction, which had been introduced by Chou in Hanoi in March 1971, was last invoked by Peking during DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's visit last November.

^{**} Peking had last expressed support for the communist peace plan in a 30 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article denouncing the President's 26 April address on Vietnam.

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"breached the defense line north and northwest of Saigon." It cited specific alleged achievements in fighting in Binh Long, Tay Ninh, and Gia Dinh provinces. In addition, the communique made an apparent allusion to recent fighting in Phoc Tuy when it claimed that "northeast of Saigon, the liberation armed forces and people surrounded and assaulted three military subsectors, broke the enemy coercive machine in many hamlets and villages close to the military subsectors, and seized control of Highway 23." A 3 June NHAN DAN editorial, pegged to the communique, was more specific when it claimed that in Ba Ria (the communist designation for Phoc Tuy) and Long Khanh "armed forces and people in recent days have managed to use their on-the-spot forces to crack the enemy's eastern Saigon defense line." The editorial asserted: "Our regional troops decimated many puppet battalions and companies in the Dat Do area, beseiged and attacked the Xuyen Moc, Long Le, and Duc Thanh miliwary subsectors, cut enemy movements and supply operations on Highway 23, and broke many enemy columns on rescue or arations."

Listing statistics on alleged allied losses in eastern Nam Bo since the beginning of the offensive, the communique claimed that over 20,000 "enemy personnel" were put out of action, including 3,000 taken prisoner. It said that the ARVN 5th Division had been "badly mauled" and that the 25th, 18th, and 21st divisions, the 15th Regiment of the 9th Division, and the airborne brigade were among units "heavily trounced." The claims to have inflicted severe losses on Saigon units were underlined elsewhere in the communique when it generalized that four infantry divisions were "struck from the rolls or suffered heavy casualties"; that all out of the 14 multibattalion units and brigades of the ARVN mobile force of the 3d Corps and the strategic general reserve were "put out of combat or heavily decimated"; and that over one-half of the armored units were "knocked out."

The communique also alleged that the PLAF in eastern Nam Bo shot down or destroyed on the ground nearly 200 aircraft and captured or destroyed some 700 military vehicles. The 3 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the communique specified that 250 of the vehicles destroyed or captured were tanks and armored vehicles. According to the communique, the PLAF also "liberated" a "vast area" including "most" of Binh Long, two districts of Phuoc Long, part of Tay Ninh, and many areas and villages in northern Gia Dinh, Ba Ria, and Thu Dau Mot provinces.

The significance of the alleged successes in eastern Nam Bo was stressed in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial which declared that "the struggle on this battlefield directly affects the Saigon-Cholon area and directly supports the development of the offensive positions in the Mekong Delta."

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USSR-YUGOSLAVIA

SOVIET MEDIA PLAY UP TITO VISIT, SANITIZE HIS TV REMARKS

Soviet media are devoting extensive coverage to Yugoslav President Tito's five-day official visit to Moscow, which began on 5 June, playing up the warmth of his reception and the prospect of further Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation. Despite such efforts, however, differences between the two sides on "some international questions" were openly acknowledged by the Yugoslav news agency, TANJUG. These differences were also reflected in the exchange of toasts between Tito and Brezhnev at a dinner on the 5th at which the Yugoslav president received the Order of Lenin. While Brezhnev used the occasion to hail "the great significance" of the U.S.-Soviet summit, he seemed notably defensive on Vietnam and in his insistence on the "internationalist" thrust of Soviet foreign policy. In contrast, Tito was less enthusiastic in assessing the summit results, pointing to "the paradox" that such "positive" developments should occur while "the aggression against North Vietnam continues."

In an interview prepared for Soviet television on 31 May, Tito made one of his strongest attacks to date on U.S. Vietnam policy, and he pointedly lectured "all the socialist countries" on the need to aid the DRV. The interview was heavily sanitized in the TASS summary published in PRAVDA on the 4th. Although the Yugoslavs obviously do not wish to exacerbate relations with Moscow, which have greatly improved since 1968, Tito's remarks were nevertheless intended to lecture Moscow on its international obligations.

TITO TV President Tito's 31 May prerecorded interview with a INTERVIEW Soviet correspondent, which reportedly was shown on Soviet TV on 3 June, was given varying treatment by Yugoslav and Soviet media, reflecting differing political sensitivities. According to the text of the interview provided by TANJUG on 3 June, Tito--asked for his assessment of the international situation, including Vietnam--expressed "great abhorrence" at "the horror" of the destruction of property and numan life allegedly caused by the U.S. bombing and shelling of the North, as well as concern that "this tragedy may assume even wider proportions." In the TANJUG account, Tito declared: "I ask myself how the people who should be responsible for peace in the world and who are responsible -- let's mention, for example, some leading U.S. figures and circles--can think they can subjugate a nation which has demonstrated so clearly that

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it is ready to fight for its freedom and independence to the last drop of its blood." In effect lecturing Moscow on its obligations to Hanoi, Tito added:

It is the duty of all socialist countries, and not only of socialist countries but of all progressive forces in the world, to do all they can to help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against invasion and against the efforts to bring them to their knees. We are all obliged to help these people, both materially and politically, wherever it is possible to do so, to infuse them with even more moral strength so that they may endure to the end in this struggle.

On 3 June TASS issued a heavily censored summary of the interview which was published in PRAVDA on the 4th. The TASS summary, which did not indicate the date of the interview, deleted Tito's expression of "great abhorrence" at "the horrors" of the U.S. actions, his references to those responsible for peace, and his comments on the duty of "all socialist countries." TASS merely rendered the latter passage: "We are all obliged to do all we can to help the Vietnamese people both materially and politically. . . "

CORDIAL Tito's arrival at Vnukovo airport was carried live RECEPTION by Moscow radio and television, and PRAVDA on the 5th published a frontpage picture and biography of the Yugoslav president. In accord with protocol--the CPSU as well as the Soviet Government had issued the invitation to Tito at the conclusion of Brezhnev's September 1971 visit to Belgrade -- the Yugoslav president was greeted by Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin. The TASS account of the arrival noted that Tito was "warmly welcomed" by "representatives of the working people of Moscow" who were present at the airport. It noted that flags of the two countries as well as streamers lined the streets from the airport to the Kremlin hailing "the fraternal friendship between the peoples of the two countries" and that crowds lining the streets greeted Tito.

BREZHNEV, TITO Symbolizing the rapprochement that has occurred SPEECHES since Soviet-Yugoslav relations were strained over the intervention in Czechoslovakia,

President Podgornyy presented the Order of Lenin to Tito at a dinner in his honor on the 5th. The honor had been granted Tito on his 80th birthday a week earlier.

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Speaking at the dinner, Brezhnev, according to TASS, expressed appreciation for the Yugoslav president's "friendly attitude" toward the USSR and called for cooperation between the two countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalia. Brezhnev made reference to "the strength and viability" if the principles of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation formulated in the September 1971 Belgrade statement, but he made no mention of the accords signed in Belgrade in 1955 and in Moscow in 1956. The 1971 Belgrade statement had emerged as a composition of giving unqualified approval to various "forms" of socialism and to equality in party relations—assurances spelled out in the earlier declarations.

In line with the continuing Soviet efforts to play up the results of the Moscow summit, Brezhnev used the occasion to hail the "great significance" of the summit for the cause of world peace—"the high stake of all people." Against the background of Tito's television lecture on Vietnam and international "duty," Brezhnev was manifestly defensive in his insistence that "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been, is, and will continue to be a socialist, class, and internationalist one." He noted in this context that the Soviet support and aid to the Indochinese have been "invariable."

In response, Tito reaffirmed Yugoslav readiness for "all-round development" of relations with the Soviet Union, but made clear that such relations could not be at the expense of Yugoslav sovereignty and nonalinement. Recent fruitful cooperation and the long-term basis for relations between the two states and "parties," he noted, are based on "the consistent implementation of the Belgrade declaration, the Moscow statement, and the Yugoslav-Soviet statement of September 1971." In another passage, Tito cited the need for international relations based on "respect for the principles of equality"; he also stressed the importance of "the nonalined countries" as "a substantial factor" in promoting world peace—in effect underscoring the standard Yugoslav line that peace is not the responsibility of the superpowers alone.

Tito assessed the Moscow summit "positively"; but using a formula that could encompass the President's visit to Peking, he also characterized as "positive" other meetings of "statesmen that took place of late." Although taking a

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more restrainci line on Vietnam than he had in his 31 May interview, Tito nevertheless perceived "a paradox" in the fact that such "positive processes" as the summit are taking place "while some peoples are denied the inalienable rights to independence and free development through the use of force and crude pressure." On the latter score he noted: "The aggression against the Vietnamese peoples continues; occupation of territories of some peoples, as for instance, in the Middle East, is being tolerated."

REPORTS ON A TASS account of Tito's talks with Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyy on the 6th stated that TALKS "they discussed topical international questions and mutual cooperation in the interests of consolidating socialism and peace." A more informative TANJUG dispatch from Moscow on the same day reported that Brezhnev briefed Tito on the results of the U.S.-Soviet summit and that Brezhnev had characterized the summit documents as "a constructive development of Soviet-American relations." The dispatch added: "Brezhnev emphasized, it is being gathered, that the Soviet Union had the full support and understanding of the socialist countries, including Vietnam, for these talks." Noting that the Yugoslav side "presented its views" on the international situation, TANJUG quoted unnamed sources for the opinion that "there exist some differences in views and interpretations of various world events," but that "basically there was a similarity in views on international questions."

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PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO POLAND

WARCAW MEDIA HAIL VISIT AS BY-PRODUCT OF MOSCOW SUMMIT

President Nixon's 31 May-1 June visit to the Polish capital has been accorded warm, enthusiastic treatment by Warsaw media. However, apparently out of official concern not to offend Moscow, Polish media have not carried anything comparable to the volume of comment that appeared in Soviet media on the Moscow talks.

TASS and PRAVDA carried prompt reports of the President's visit to Warsaw, including a summary of the 1 June communique. TASS on the 5th took the unusual step of reporting a Polish party Politburo meeting that day, a session which it noted "heard information" from the Polish leaders "on the Polish-American talks" and approved the results.

"CONSTRUCTIVE" TALKS After the President had been duly welcomed with biographies and cordial articles in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU, the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY, and other Warsaw papers on the 31st, the media carried reports of his trival and subsequent activities, including the texts of is and the Polish leaders' speeches. Following the issuance of the final communique on the 1st, the news agency PAP carried a commentary warmly endorsing the visit as "needed and useful" and a report of worldwide reaction to the visit featuring the "frank, businesslike, and constructive" nature of the Warsaw talks. On the 2d, TRYBUNA LUDU carried another roundup of favorable world comment on the visit, extensively summarized by PAP, and a Pawlak commentary in the Warsaw domestic service concluded that the visit's results "are beyond any doubt useful and augur well for the future."

On the 3d, two days after the President's departure, authoritative articles appeared in the two principal dailies under the signatures of a leading TRYBUNA LUDU commentator, Adam Stanek, and ZYCIE WARSZAWY's chief editor, Ryszard Wojna, respectively. Both articles were extensively summarized in English by PAP, which called them "editorials." PAP had called Stanek's 31 May TRYBUNA LUDU commentary welcoming the President an "article" but gave no designation to Wojna's 31 May commentary in ZYCIE WARSZAWY. On both dates, the articles appeared in the papers in the same format, without designation.

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The 3 June TRYBUNA LUDU article by Stanek, entitled "After the Polish-American Talks--Constructive and Useful," stressed that "the weighty results" of the President's talks in Moscow and the agreements signed there "were of basic import for the course and results of the Warsaw talks." Underscoring the primacy of the Moscow summit, it observed that "the Moscow agreements were hailed in Poland as a great success of the common political line of the socialist countries" and "have given rise to the essential assumptions and conditions of the Polish-American talks." The main result of the Moscow talks, it said, was the acceptance by both sides of the principle of peaceful coexistence, a principle prominently featured in the Polish-American communique.

The Stanek article welcomed "the acceptance by the United States leaders of the principles of realism," in both the Moscow and Warsaw talks, with regard to the convocation of a European security conference and the conclusion of the Soviet and Polish treaties with the FRG. Dealing at length with bilateral relations, the article welcomed the establishment of a joint Polish-American trade commission and the signing of a consular convention by Secretary Rogers and Foreign himister Olszowski on 31 May. The article briefly alluded to the two sides' "divergent" views on Indochina and called on the United States to end the mining of DRV ports and return to the Paris talks. And it summed up the Warsaw talks as "fruitful, to put it simply."

The shorter article by Wojna in ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 3d, entitled "Along the Lines of the Moscow Accords," hailed the principle of peaceful coexistence contained in the "Basic Principles" document signed in Moscow and stressed that the Warsaw talks "are the first test that fully confirms the possibility and purposefulness of moving along the road set by the Moscow agreements." It also highlighted favorable results of the talks in Warsaw on bilateral relations and European security and cited the continued divergencies on Vietnam.

Editorial comments along similar lines also appeared in other Warsaw dailies on 3-4 June--the Catholic paper SLOWO POWSZECHNE, the trade union paper GLOS PRACY, and the youth paper SZTANDAR MLODYCH. TRYBUNA LUDU on the 3d carried an extensive summary of the President's) June address to the joint session of Congress--including his reference to relations with the People's Republic of China.

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CHINA

PEKING TAKES BRIEF NOTE OF MOSCOW SUMMIT, VARIOUS ACCORDS

Peking thus far has given the Soviet-U.S. summit only minimal coverage, in the form of a factual NCNA dispatch dated 2 June covering President Nixon's entire itinerary. This has been the only break in PRC media's silence on the President's trip to the Soviet Union since NCNA reported the original announcement last October. Unlike that report, which was carried only in NCNA's domestic service, the 2 June report was disseminated by NCNA in both its domestic and international services and was broadcast in Radio Peking's international services. Having taken note in the 2 June dispatch of the Soviet-U.S. agreements signed during the summit talks, Peking subsequently reported—in another factual NCNA dispatch, dated 5 June—the signing of the quadrilateral Berlin accord and the exchange of instruments of ratification of the FRG's treaties with the USSR and Poland.

The 2 June NCNA report, which avoided any comment on the President's trip, noted that the Soviet Union and the United States issued a joint communique and a document on principles governing their mutual relations, and that they signed seven agreements and agreed to establish a trade commission. NCNA specified the subjects of the agreements, including those limiting strategic arms. However, apart from noting that the talks covered both bilateral relations "and the current international situation," NCNA made no mention of international issues, thereby avoiding acknowledgment of the differences registered on Vietnam and the Middle East, areas where the Chinese seek influence at the expense of the superpowers. The dispatch noted the President's return to Washington on 1 June but made no mention of his address to Congress that night, which included references to relations with the PRC.

Peking's noncommittal reaction to the Moscow summit and the other agreements, which might be viewed as adversely affecting Chinese interests by reducing the "contradictions" between the two superpowers and strengthening Moscow's hand to cope with China, may have been a calculated show of restraint in accord with its effort to accent the positive in place of its former role as an obstructionist element in international affairs. Peking's disquiet over moves toward Soviet-U.S. and European detente has long been a matter of record, as in the authoritative joint editorial on New Year's Day which denounced Moscow for having "colluded" with

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the United States "in nuclear deals" and for "selling out the sovereignty" of the GDR by signing the Berlin agreement. In another expression of its misgivings, Peking's favorable account of the Tito-Ceausescu talks last month pointedly ignored the joint communique's endorsements of the Soviet and Polish treaties with West Germany and of an early convocation of a European security conference.

Peking's reaction to the Moscow summit may also have been shaped by its own interests in the triangular relationship, particularly its newly emerging relations with the United States. The New Year's Day joint editorial had invoked Mao's authority for the view that international affairs "must be settled by all concerned through consultation" and "must not be decided by the two big powers." According to the editorial, "gone are the days when representatives of the two superpowers could decide the destinies of other countries at will by sitting down together and making deals behind their backs." Having subsequently sat down for summit talks with the leader of one of the superpowers, Peking's own reaction to world developments has become complicated by new constraints.

These constraints seemed reflected in Peking's muted treatment of May Day and the anniversary of Mao's 20 May 1970 anti-U.S. statement, events which last year occasioned major policy statements but this year were marked with conspicuous restraint. In both cases the United States was the beneficiary of Peking's more guarded approach at the expense of proletarian internationalist interests. On the day of the President's departure on his trip, Peking marked the anniversary of Mao's 20 May statement with a low-level commentary in PEOPLE'S DAILY portraying an emerging united front against the two superpowers. The major celebration of the anniversary tast year had included a joint editorial calling for an international united front to "isolate and strike at the chief enemy," identified as the United States.

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MIDDLE EAST

ARAB-ISRAELI JUNE 1967 WAR ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY USSR, PRC

MOSCOW Soviet media gave only meager attention to the fifth anniversary of the June 1967 war. Articles in the 5 June IZVESTIYA, reviewed by TASS, and PRAVDA, summarized by TASS and in the Arabic service, as well as a Moscow domestic service commentary the same day mention the anniversary only in passing, while unanimously blaming Israel for the failure to achieve a settlement. All emphasize the November 1967 Security Council resolution as a busis for a solution, with the domestic service commentary additionally emphasizing that successful implementation of the Jarring mission is the "only alternative" to war. Only the PRAVDA article, as rendered in Arabic, specifically mentions the United States in referring to U.S. "bribes" to Israel. Moscow's treatment of the anniversary last year was generally low key, but there was a 5 June PRAVDA article by one of the paper's former Middle East specialists, Yevgeniy Primakov, and a three-part interview with him was broadcast in the Arabiclanguage service to mark the anniversary. Primakov had focused largely on the U.S. role in the Middle East, in the wake of Secretary Rogers' Middle East tour the previous morth.

This year IZVESTIYA's Cairo correspondent Koryavin dealt chiefly with the damages caused by the closure of the Suez Canal, judging from TASS' review of the article. PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov took as his text Brezhnev's remark, in his 20 March AUCCTU speech, on long-term factors in the Middle East and the eventual alignment of forces there; Glukhov argued that time had introduced "fundamental adjustments" in the Middle East balance of power. Using Egypt as an example, he conceded that the country's development was taking place under "complicated circumstances" and that the failure to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute provided a suitable atmosphere for "activating domestic and foreign reaction." But he maintained that "reactionary intrigues" had been repelled. Drawing on the phraseology in the 29 April communique on President as-Sadat's latest Moscow visit, Glukhov affirmed the Arabs' right to "look for various means" to establish peace in the region, adding that the Arab countries now have "other potentialities" compared with their situation in June 1967.

Prefacing the Ryzhikov commentary on the domestic service, the announcer recalled not the June war anniversary but the third anniversary of the Moscow conference of communist and workers parties which had adopted a statement on the Middle East.

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Ryzhikov, like Glukhov, stressed the change in the balance of forces and asserted that the Arabs have the right "to use not just poaceful means, but any available means" to restore justice. But he carefully added that the Arab countries "are still prepared" to take advantage of any opportunity to find a peaceful settlement.

TASS on the 6th briefly reported Egyptian President as-Sadat's speech the previous day "in connection with the fifth anniversary of the Israeli aggression," citing him as saying Egypt is resolved "to fight for the liberation" of the occupied territories. TASS said he recalled Egypt's main demands "related to the complete withdrawal" of Israeli forces. The Egyptian president in fact said that he told the Soviet leaders in April of Egypt's views "so that they could be communicated" during the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting. He added that he had summed up Cairo's stand in three points: rejection of any agreement whatsoever "to restrict our freedom to obtain arms" before complete Israeli withdrawal, rejection of the "status quo," and rejection of any negotiations over borders.

PEKING The PRC, marking the fifth anniversary with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 5th, added emphasis to its previous advice to the Arabs in urging them "in the first place" to maintain independence, keep the initiative in their own hands, and rely on their own efforts and give "second place" to foreign aid. In thus outlining priorities designed to reduce Soviet influence, Peking underscored the point made by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei at a 26 March banquet in Peking given by Egyptian President as-Sadat's special envoy Mahmud Riyad. Chi on that occasion had said that any country could increase its national strength and defeat foreign aggressive forces by "pursuing a policy of maintaining independence and relying mainly on its own strength and regarding foreign assistance as supplementary."

PEOPLE'S DAILY routinely referred to U.S. backing for the "Israeli Zionists" and the "reactionary Jordanian forces" represented by King Husayn. Along the lines of Chiao Kuan-hua's 8 December UNGA speech on the Middle East, the editorial asserted that the "superpowers"--taking advantage of "temporary difficulties" of the Palestinians and other Arabs--tried to make political deals at the Arabs' expense. Against the background of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty concluded in April and Moscow's assistance to Iraq and Libya in developing their oil resources, PEOPLE'S DAILY accused the superpowers of trying to "seize strategic areas and oil resources" in the Middle East.

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The paper optimistically welcomed strengthened unity "among the Palestinian guerrillas" and between the Palestinians and other Arab peoples and urged pursuit of unity and protracted struggle to assure final victory.

MOSCOW, PEKING INDICATE DISAPPROVAL OF LOD AIRPORT INCIDENT

In keeping with Moscow's past guarded treatment of airline hijackings staged by Palestinian fedayeen, Soviet media obscure any fedayeen connection with the 30 May incident at Lod airport in Tel Aviv when, as TASS reported, "three armed Japanese naationals opened fire on the passengers, killing and wounding many people." Moscow's first report, a domestic service account on the 31st, merely said that correspondents were trying to find out more about this "rather obscure and complicated affair." Moscow has subsequently stressed Israel's "threats" and "unfounded accusations" linking Lebanon with the "terrorist actions" at Lod airport, and has cited Lebunese officials as condemning the incident and denying any responsibility. A commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 4th provided the only implicit connection between the Palestinians and the airport episode, observing that "Zionist propaganda" accused the Lebanese Government of "assisting the Palestinian patriots to wage the struggle against the aggressor," and adding that Israel seeks to end such support. In reporting as-Sadat's anniversary speech, TASS ignored his remark on "Israeli threats to the area following the Lod airport incident," merely noting that he called attention to Israel's "policy of terror and reprisals."

Peking, normally full of praise for Palestinian exploits but cautious about adventurist actions, was even more cryptic than Moscow. Conveying PRC displeasure, NCNA in a 4 June dispatch from Damascus made no mention of the Lod incident in reporting that the Lebanese premier had declared that "whenever an attack took place inside Israel," that country started making threats and accusations against Lebanon. Another NCNA dispatch the same day, recounting the "heroic" feats of Palestinian guerrillas in "repulsing" Israel's February intrusions into southern Lebanon, charged Israel with again building up its forces along the Lebanese border but did not connect this with the Lod attack.

Peking's effort to strike a balance between its support for the Palestinian struggle and its relations with the Arab governments was strikingly demonstrated by the absence of any PRC observances of "Palestine Day" in May, generally held on the anniversary of

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Israel's 1948 proclamation of independence. This year NCNA merely noted DRV and DPRK press support of the Palestinians, whereas in 1971 a "Palestine international week" was marked by a rally addressed by Kuo Mo-jo, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, and publicity for the activities of a visiting Palestine Liberation Organization delegation. The occasion was observed in various fashions in previous years. The current PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the June war anniversary also pointed up Peking's stress on its relations with the Arab states as well as with the Palestinians in repeatedly referring to the "Egyptian, Syrian, and other Arab" peoples as well as the Palestinians; the previous formula had affirmed support for "the Palestinian and other Arab" peoples.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

MASHEROV LAUDS BREZHNEV FOR SUMMIT TALKS AND FRG TREATY

Belorussian First Secretary and Politburo candidate member Masherov used the occasion of the 31 May Supreme Soviet Presidium session to praise Brezhnev personally for his role in organizing the summit talks and the treaty with West Germany. Although Masherov has not been among Brezhnev's more ardent supporters in the past, he becomes the first official to portray Brezhnev as the prime mover behind the summit meeting, and he was the only one of the nine speakers (including Podgornyy, Suslov and Leningrad Secretary G. V. Romanov) at the 31 May session to have done so. Masherov's praise is particularly noteworthy in view of his antipathy toward the domestic welfare goals advanced by Brezhnev at the 24th Congress.

Masherov declared that the treaty's ratification "and also the just successfully-concluded Moscow Soviet-American negotiations on the highest level are the logical and natural result of the tireless, consistent and Leninist farsighted activity of the Politburo of our party's Central Committee, the Soviet Government and L. I. Brezhnev personally, and also of N. V. Podgornyy, A. N. Kosygin and other members of the Politburo" He further declared, "the role and merits of comrade L. I. Brezhnev in this great matter are truly outstanding" (IZVESTIYA, 1 June). Masherov's statement clearly goes beyond other authoritative pronouncements, for example, the 2 June PRAVDA editorial called the ratification of the West German treaty "the natural result of the tireless and consistent activity of the Central Committee of our party and the Politburo . . ."

ECONOMICS INSTITUTE FORCED TO ADOPT MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

In the wake of criticism by the Central Committee and the removal of its director, the conservative Institute of Economics has dropped its long-time hostility toward mathematical economic methods. In a May QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article on the "main orientations" of the institute's scientific work, new director Ye. I. Kapustin declared that the institute will henceforth use "modern mathematical economic methods" and the "positive results"

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of the work of its arch-rival, the Central Mathematical Economics Institute, and that the new methods will be introduced into the work of all departments and sectors of the institute "without exception."

Kapustin, former director of the Scientific Research Institute of Labor, replaced long-time institute director L. M. Gatovskiy in the fall of 1971, and in December the Central Committee adopted a decree criticizing the Economics Institute for devoting "extremely little attention" to the introduction of mathematical economic methods. Such methods had been pioneered by the Central Mathematical Economics Institute under director N. P. Fedorenko, a computer enthusiast, but resisted by the political economists of the Economics Institute. The long-time struggle between innovators and conservatives in this field was noted in a November 1971 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article by PRAVDA first deputy editor V. G. Afanasyev, which criticized both the "conservatives" who cling to "traditional methods" and oppose the "cybernetic boom" and the all-out enthusiasts of computerization in management.

Criticizing the Economics Institute for poor leadership of economic debates, the Central Committee decree ordered the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium to prepare new guidelines for the institute and to reorganize its structure. Kapustin's article reveals the new guidelines established by the academy and the new structure of the institute. The same issue of QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS reports a 29 February meeting of the Economics Branch of the academy at which Fedorenko, who became its academic secretary last year, reported on the Central Committee's criticism of the Economics Institute.